Will Russia’s Syrian downfall prompt a Damascene conversion in the Sahel?

Debates over the future of Russia’s two military bases in Syria shed light on the variables affecting its ability to project power and provide security cooperation in the Sahel.
Putin defiant amidst hurried retreat from Syria
Russia “achieved its goals” in Syria nearly ten years after intervening in support of Bashar al-Assad in the country’s civil war, President Vladimir Putin told reporters in December, contradicting images of hasty troop evacuations just days before. Russia scrambled to evacuate troops from its Khmeimim airbase, and redeployed ships from its Tartus naval base, amidst a lightning offensive, led by Syrian rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), that toppled longstanding ally Bashar al-Assad’s 24-year rule.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov indicated that “constructive” talks were underway with Syria’s HTS-led government regarding the status of Khmeimim and Tartus. For the time being, it does not seem a complete withdrawal from Syria is imminent. But the Kremlin’s failure to defend Assad’s regime, and long-term uncertainty about the future of these bases, expose a network of fragile alliances that underpin its aspirations as a global powerbroker.
The importance of Syria for Russia’s operations in Africa
Russia holds a 49-year lease on the two bases, granted by Assad as part of its intervention in the Syrian civil war, although its presence at Tartus dates back to the Cold War. The bases act as key hubs for transferring Russian arms, personnel, and equipment to North Africa and the Sahel. This has enabled Russia to play a role in the Libyan civil war, as well as to forge pacts with military regimes in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, where Russian mercenaries have been tasked with combatting Islamist insurgencies across the Sahel region.
It is too early to say whether Russia will strike a deal to secure the bases – one that would enable its military logistics in Africa to continue. While Russia’s bloody history in Syria remains painfully fresh for the millions who lived under Assad’s rule, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has adopted a pragmatic approach to negotiations with Moscow. But its failure to protect the Assad regime has consequences for North Africa and the Sahel.
Libya as a strategic pivot
Russia has temporarily pivoted southward in an attempt to counter its strategic loss in Syria, reportedly transferring equipment and personnel to the al-Khadim air base in the eastern Libya desert. In theory, scaling its long-term presence in the north African country would enable the flow of Russian military logistics to continue. However, in practice, Moscow is encountering fierce resistance from the UN-backed government in Tripoli, while NATO members are likely to put pressure on Turkey to curtail Russian movements along key shipping straits separating the Black Sea from the Mediterranean.
The Trump factor
Russia’s ability to maintain a strategic foothold in Africa also depends on what happens in the White House. Trump’s campaign promise to end the war in Ukraine in “24 hours” could still play into Russia’s global aspirations, with potential Ukrainian territory concessions allowing Moscow to redeploy forces and resume operations in Africa from a position of strength. However, this scenario may not materialise for several months – if at all – with presidential advisors conceding that a peace deal remains a distant prospect.
Growing opportunities for middle powers
Few of these geopolitical variables will matter if pro-Russia juntas in the Sahel begin to doubt the credibility of Russia’s security offering. Military rulers in the insurgency-hit region are belatedly realising that Russian troops alone may not provide more effective security assistance than the Western partners they expelled. In Mali, for instance, Islamist insurgents orchestrated ambushes in July and November 2024 which collectively resulted in the deaths of nearly one hundred Russian mercenaries. However, with the Burkinabé, Malian and Nigerien juntas doubling down on their regional integration project – the Alliance of Sahel States – the putschists are increasingly isolated, limiting their choice of security partners.
Meanwhile, there is a growing opportunity for middle powers such as Turkey, which has increased drone sales to Burkina Faso and Mali, while benefiting from the exit of French and U.S. troops to strengthen defence cooperation across the region. Having watched Moscow’s inability – and perhaps unwillingness – to protect an allied regime in Syria, the Sahelian juntas may be amenable to diversifying their partnerships with non-aligned middle powers.
What’s next for Russia in Africa?
Russia’s reduced presence in Syria does not signal the end of its ambitions in Africa. However, it has exposed the variables affecting its ability to advance interests abroad, particularly while the majority of Russian troops and resources are engaged in Ukraine. Increased cooperation with non-aligned middle powers could also indicate that Russia’s African allies are seeking to diversify their security partnerships, potentially weakening Moscow’s power projection in the region.